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socio-economic and political forces penetrated into-and, indeed, became part of-the colonial body of Mauritius. This fundamental dependency was highlighted in the politics of independence by ethnic tensions and the problem of unemployment.
Indians in the Creole Society
From the time that sugar began to be grown on a large scale it has determined the peopling of Mauritius. The number of slaves increased with the need for workers on the plantations, and when abolition took place the demand had become insatiable with rising sugar prices and high profits, but by then cheap indentured labour from India was providing a more lucrative form of exploitation for the planters, as well as being more acceptable to the British. The Indians brought a radical and permanent change in the ethnic composition of the island: in 1835 they formed a tiny fraction of the population of oo100,000ooo, of whom 80,ooo were slaves, but by i86i they represented two-thirds of all the inhabitants, and this proportion has been maintained to the present day. A total of 450,000 Indians came to Mauritius as indentured labourers, and most stayed.
When the Indians arrived the three-tier colonial creole society was well established in Mauritius. The British on taking the island in 1810io had found a small number of whites of French origin at the top, large numbers of black slaves at the bottom, and an intermediate group -in size as well as colour -in the middle. The colonial administrators kept and strengthened that pyramidal-type of structure, grafting themselves on at the apex. When slavery was abolished, the indentured Indians replaced the slaves on the plantations and moved to the bottom of the creole hierarchy.
Within this rigid social structure some mobility was nevertheless possible through the acquisition of land. The growing of sugar in Mauritius is a seasonal activity, and in time the planters discovered that it was more economical to employ labourers on a daily basis via a contractor, rather than keeping them tied to the plantations all the year round. The contractor was usually an 'old immigrant' Indian who could speak creole and one or more Indian languages, and he received an agreed sum for a given number of labourers where and when required. The contractor was thus in a strategic position to draw to himself part of the surplus produced by the labour power of his men, and with the capital thus accumulated he bought land from the planters.
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Sugar milling has always been more profitable than growing sugar. The white planters would sometimes, in bad years, decide to sell or lease part of their land in plots to Indians, but only on the understanding that they would grow sugar and bring the cane to their mills. The Indians, using family labour, were able to produce sugar on marginal land which had become uneconomical for the planters when prices fell. Planters might also give their favourite sirdar -a kind of field foremansmall inferior plots of land for market gardening and hence extra cash. Thus, gradually, by hard work and saving, with favours from the planters, and through the exploitation of their fellow countrymen, a number of Indians amassed money and bought land. A few acquired great prosperity as large and rich sugar-estate owners in their own right, while many others became 'small planters', owning anything from less than one to several hundred acres of cane.
Just under half the cultivated land of Mauritius is owned today by Indians.1 Increasingly, in recent years, the sons of many of these planters have moved up the educational ladder into the public services and the professions, while more and more have entered politics. Thus, slowly at first, but much more rapidly since World War II, a sizeable Indian middle stratum has emerged, closely linked with the sugar industry, but now helping to mitigate the class confrontation of the white millers/planters and the Indian sugar proletariat.
THE POLITICS OF INDEPENDENCE
There are only a few examples where an indigenous society has been able to liberate itself from the domination of a foreign power and its local agents, and Mauritius could hardly be one of them. Here 'decolonisation' was merely a rearrangement of the internal balance of political power, and the colonial government played a major role in ensuring that there would be continuity in the internal structure of the society, as well as the external linkages. Hence the explanation for the leisurely pace set by the British, because although electoral and constitutional reforms started in 1948, the island did not become independent until I968.
Internal pressures for change had taken a class basis at first. A number of creole artisans and intellectuals had joined with a few Indian professionals to press for constitutional reforms, and for the right to 
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Internal pressures for change had taken a class basis at first. A number of creole artisans and intellectuals had joined with a few Indian professionals to press for constitutional reforms, and for the right to groomed by the Colonial Office to take over at independence.
By way of contrast, a kind of franco-Mauritian nationalism emerged, especially during periods of strain in the colonial partnership between the British administration and the white French-speaking owners of the sugar industry, and this had the effect of strengthening the attachment of all categories of creoles to the French language, and even to demands for the island to be returned to France.2 But the nationalism of the creoles could never go very far because the interests of the sugar plantocracy were so closely tied with the British Empire. The Frenchspeaking planters protested now and again, but on the whole they were not too dissatisfied with an arrangement which guaranteed their privileges, their supply of labour, and a market for their sugar, without interfering unduly with their cultural and sentimental attachment to France. Large numbers of coloured creoles had their interests tied to their jobs in the civil service, and however francophile they remained they could not afford to be too anti-British. For many years creole 'reactionaries' and 'liberals' were divided more virulently over questions of colour and voting rights than the constitutional status of the island. Moreover, to the extent that creole nationalism aimed at reintegration with France, rather than independence for Mauritius, it alienated the majority of the population which by then was Indian.
With the advent of even limited constitutional and electoral reforms, the white sugar barons could see political power slipping to the descendants of' their' indentured labourers, and so they looked for and found political allies on an ethnic basis. The coloured creoles were traditionally intermediaries, not only between the white owners and the Indian sugar proletariat, but also in the civil service between the British administrators and the public at large. With the rise of the Indian middle-class they felt that they were being squeezed out of government employment, and had a number of real grudges which could easily be activated politically. The ex-African slaves, displaced from the plantations with the coming of the Indians, had moved to the coast and to the towns. They earned a meagre living by fishing in the lagoons with primitive equipment, and by working as stevedors, drivers, and artisans. Many were more-or-less permanently unemployed and formed a lumpenproletariat on the margin of the sugar economy. Most of the creoles, the rich white mill-owners, the middle-class coloured civil servants and professionals, and the black unemployed were Roman Catholics. In spite of their colour/social conflicts, and the growing class gulf between them, they all in their different ways felt threatened by the Indians, and responded readily to an ethnic political appeal.
The creoles also gained political support from other minority groups. The strategy of the P.M.S.D. was to press for a referendum to be held in Mauritius on the straight issue of independence versus association, and at the same time to make a general appeal to all Mauritians, irrespective ofcommunities, to reject independence. The party conducted a skilful campaign, ably led by a young populist leader, Ga'tan Duval, and 'Hindu mon Frere' became the slogan on island platforms, if not in the intimacy of creole clubs and drawing rooms. The enormous resources of the sugar industry helped the P.M.S.D. to draw large numbers of Indians -particularly the young -to its ranks.
It is most improbable, however, that London would have agreed to the plans of the P.M.S.D. whatever the wishes of the inhabitants.3
The P.M.S.D. was originally known as Le Parti mauricien, but social democrate was later added, mainly to impress the British Labour Government, and a long document tried to establish its credentials as a social democratic party (Port-Louis, n.d. The strategy of the P.M.S.D. was to press for a referendum to be held in Mauritius on the straight issue of independence versus association, and at the same time to make a general appeal to all Mauritians, irrespective ofcommunities, to reject independence. The party conducted a skilful campaign, ably led by a young populist leader, Ga'tan Duval, and 'Hindu mon Frere' became the slogan on island platforms, if not in the intimacy of creole clubs and drawing rooms. The enormous resources of the sugar industry helped the P.M.S.D. to draw large numbers of Indians -particularly the young -to its ranks.
Mauritius was a most unlikely part of the British Empire to be made part of the United Kingdom: apart from an absence of any 'kith and kin' there, the creole elite had made many of the British administrators feel alien in their own Crown Colony. The island, moreover, had problems of over-population and unemployment which the P.M.S.D. proposed to solve by emigration, the very opposite of the British policy of restricting the growing influx of coloured people. The price of sugar was also at an all-time low, and London did not relish the prospect of having to subsidise Mauritius.1 Besides, formal colonial attachments, of any kind, were no longer suited to the contemporary world. Having begun to make the necessary internal arrangements for the creation of a neo-colonial regime, Britain was anxious to get out,2 but characteristically 'played the Mauritians along' in order to maintain a central interest in the area.
From the early I9g6os onwards an Anglo-American team of experts had been surveying the small islands in the Indian Ocean for a suitable site for one or more military bases. A decision was taken to build an airport with a runway capable of handling the largest civilian and military aircraft on Mahe, the main island of the Seychelles, which would also promote long-distance international tourism in order to reduce the local recurrent burden on the British Treasury.3 The military part of the airport project was later abandoned when the United States insisted that Mahe was much too heavily populated to serve as a secure and effective oceanic base, especially as even a small but unfriendly government could disrupt plans and raise problems at the United Nations. The search continued, and at one point Aldabra was considered, but this raised an outcry by the world's scientific community on account of its rare fauna. Farquhar and Desroches suited the British who wanted more easily to monitor sanctions against shipping to Rhodesia via Portuguese Mozambique, but these islands were too far to the west for the Americans. In Mauritius the A.C.P. agreement, plus the high prices on the open market, amounted to a bonanza beyond the dreams of either the planters or the Government. The climate also helped because, notwithstanding a severe cyclone, the amount of rain and sun appeared in the right proportions to produce bumper crop after crop, and the output reached an all-time high. But, for the first time, there were other assets, because this boom coincided with large-scale investments in tourism and manufacturing for export.
Finally
It has often been stressed in the literature about the Third World that an important 'bottleneck' to development is the lack of capital.1 In the case of Mauritius this shortage was not a symptom ofunderdevelopment, but rather of the distorted use of the surplus in the plantation economy, itself an aspect of the structure of the global colonial relations of which the island was part. Considerable profits would be made from sugar in the years of high prices, and the planters would accumulate capital. This would be ploughed back in the industry, so long as there was room for expansion; but with practically all the cultivable land of the island under sugar, there were no outlets for the surplus in Mauritius itself. The colonial structure of international specialisation discouraged the diversification of economic growth. As the demand for sugar was not dependent on the internal market, but on the world outside, it was not in the interests of the owners of this industry to raise wages. On the contrary, cheap labour cut down production costs, reduced imports, It has often been stressed in the literature about the Third World that an important 'bottleneck' to development is the lack of capital.1 In the case of Mauritius this shortage was not a symptom ofunderdevelopment, but rather of the distorted use of the surplus in the plantation economy, itself an aspect of the structure of the global colonial relations of which the island was part. Considerable profits would be made from sugar in the years of high prices, and the planters would accumulate capital. This would be ploughed back in the industry, so long as there was room for expansion; but with practically all the cultivable land of the island under sugar, there were no outlets for the surplus in Mauritius itself. The colonial structure of international specialisation discouraged the diversification of economic growth. As the demand for sugar was not dependent on the internal market, but on the world outside, it was not in the interests of the owners of this industry to raise wages. On the contrary, cheap labour cut down production costs, reduced imports, built up balance-of-payments surpluses, and contributed to the concentration of wealth in a few hands. Low wages, in turn, meant too small a market internally to be an incentive to diversify production away from sugar.
Without investment outlets in Mauritius, therefore, some of the profits made in the sugar industry were consumed in the form of imported sophisticated luxuries, while a good deal would be saved and invested abroad.' Mauritius thus exported capital to Britain and South Africa. It is important to stress that this took place in spite of the fact that Mauritius was a-typical among sugar plantation economies in that, for historical reasons, most of the capital was locally owned. The planters never identified themselves with Britain; they lived and worked on the island, and considered themselves to be the original inhabitants. However, although Mauritius had a 'national bourgeoisie' which extracted and accumulated capital, it was structurally impossible for this small class to move outside the colonial framework. of births associated with the post-war boom in sugar prices, as well as a decline in the death rate by the rapid elimination of malaria. Indeed, by the time of independence, Mauritius had become one of the most densely populated agricultural countries in the world.1 The rate of growth, however, has fallen off during the I 70s, almost as dramatically as it went up in the I950s. Education, rising standards of living, and birth control, have all helped, but even so the total population will continue to increase in the years ahead because of its very young age-structure.
An attempt was made after independence to reduce the capital drain by legislation, but new investment outlets in Mauritius reversed the trend by keeping profits in the island
Over 50 per cent of all Mauritians are below the age of 24, and this means that every year some 9,000 new job-seekers enter the labour market; for most, the chance of ever finding work is bleak. In the sugar industry, the employment situation has gone full circle: the insatiable demand for labour in the nineteenth century caused the massive immigration of Indians, but now with all the available agricultural land under cultivation the industry cannot provide jobs for the growing population. Indeed, more sugar could only be squeezed out of the small land surface of Mauritius by shedding labour and increasing mechanisation. Further centralisation of milling, the installation of sugar silos at the port for bulk shipment to Europe, the reduction of the length of the crop season through mechanised cutting and loading of the canes, would all increase efficiency. The large estates produce considerably more sugar per acre than the 'small planters'. This is in part due to the poorer quality of land farmed, but the main reason is that the large millers/planters follow a different economic rationale. Because milling involves a great deal of fixed and relatively little variable capital, it is in the interests of the owners to do everything possible by way of fertilisers, irrigation, and machines, in order to produce a large quantity of canes, since losses in planting through over-capitalisation are more than made up when the mills work at full capacity.
By way of contrast, the 'small planters' produce less cane per acre because they do not put so much capital in their fields, and so from the Calmly, and with a discipline which could be envied by some 'older family-allowances and old-age pensions. The tax system was favourable to the 'small planters', and generally to rural inhabitants. Village development programmes and Travail pour tous had provided relief employment. However, the fact that the regime had been in office for a long time -both before and after independence -and that there were rumours of corruption and incompetence, were not in its favour. The lack of organisation of the M.L.P., its ageing leadership, and its loss of contact with the masses were grave handicaps. The amendments of the constitution, muzzling the press, banning political meetings, and not holding elections for a decade were graver still. But the fundamental problem was that the M.L.P. had inherited the British role in office: it was objectively the partner of the sugar barons. 
